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ABSTRACT
The world is becoming increasingly more interconnected with technological advances
leading to more and more globalization. It is important to see how globalization affects
society, especially in the lesser developed post-conflict regions of Africa. The theories of
liberalism, Marxism, and realism all offer plausible, yet strikingly different theories on
the relationship between globalization and conflict. This paper conceptually examines
the dominant theories of globalization and conflict, then uses open-source panel data
on globalization and conflict in Africa to empirically test which theory is supported by
the data, then tests if there is a correlation between the rate of globalization and
conflict. The purpose of this paper is to offer an explanation for the lack of theoretical
cohesiveness on the topic through analysis of panel data. The study reports three main
findings: globalization and conflict have a negative correlation, the rate of change of
globalization and conflict have a positive correlation, and, while neither are statistically
significant, the rate of change of globalization is overall more significant and more
impactful than the level of globalization.
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INTRODUCTION
Philippe Legrain says that, “The beauty of globalization is that it can free people from
the tyranny of geography,” (Legrain, 2003, p. 62) but it has also had adverse consequences on
certain economies, sometimes being viewed as the “Western Curse” (Lechner & Boli, 2008).
While some view globalization and the lowering of trade barriers as a step forward towards
economic prosperity and peace, others view free trade as a threat to domestic industries and
culture and instead choose to turn inward to more protectionist policies. Although economic
theories favor free trade and globalization, not one country in the world has completely free
trade. Milner described protectionism as, “one of the most visible theoretical gaps [in economic
theory].”
It has been noted that globalization levels, particularly foreign aid, spikes in the
immediate post-conflict phase of a nation, tapering off once the crisis is over. This
phenomenon, known as frontloading, can actually damage the potential for economic growth
and undermine the established peace (Suhrke & Buckmaster, 2005). However, there is very
little research done on how changes in the rate of globalization affect a country going into
conflict. The literature examining the relationship between conflict and globalization has been
primarily theoretical, with fundamental differences in outcomes, and only addressing whether
globalization levels increases or decreases the likelihood of conflict. The concept of
frontloading, and more generally, the rate of change of globalization, could offer one
explanation for these radically different globalization and conflict theories. It is hypothesized
that globalization reduces the number of conflicts, but high rates of change of globalization will
actually increase the number of conflicts.
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An important assumption of this paper is that conflict, while inevitable, is something
that we want to avoid, primarily due to the multifaceted cost of conflict. Fearon and Laitin
(2003) estimated that civil conflicts have led to 16.2 million deaths since the end of World War
II. For example, during the conflict of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, at least 10% of the
population (800,000 people) died, and another 3 million people fled the country. The health
effects were equally devastating. Infant mortality went up from 85 to 137 per thousand, and
HIV/AIDS spread at a rapid rate. Ten years after this conflict, it was estimated that Rwanda’s
GDP was 30 percent lower than it would have been had this conflict never happened (Panić,
2007). This assumption influences the hypothesis that globalization and trade are inversely
related. Because the world is becoming more interconnected and globalization has been
increasing, and if we assume we want to avoid conflict, we would hope that increased
globalization does not lead to increased conflict.
Additionally, this paper includes both internal civil conflict and international conflict
when referring to conflict. Because this paper belongs in the small body of literature that
examines the rate of change of globalization, it acts as a starting point, with room for further
research that looks at these different types of conflict individually.
This paper contributes to the debate about the effects of globalization and conflict by
investigating how the rate of change of globalization impacts conflict through panel data, this
paper extends the literature on the topic. The greater implications of this research are that the
results can be used to help determine how involved international businesses, governments, and
NGO’s should be in conflict-vulnerable countries. This could both decrease the likelihood of
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countries going back into conflict, keep these entities from getting overly-involved, leading to a
more efficient use of resources.

THEORY
The literature surrounding globalization and conflict is extensive; however, three
arguments lead the debate: liberalism, Marxism, and realism. These theories dominate the
conversation of the relationship between globalization and conflict and are described in further
detail below.
Significantly less research has been done about the effect the rate of economic
globalization has on conflict. UN agencies such as the UNRISD (1995) and UNCTAD (1996) argue
that the effect of rapid integration can actually make conflict more likely. They argue that
unemployment will increase due to firms attempting to recover competitiveness by shedding
labor, and government reducing civil service jobs in order to repay debts. This makes firms
more competitive by lowering their costs since they will be paying less wages. Additionally,
social services generally have been scaled back for marginal social groups and rural regions
(Fitzgerald, 1999). According to Fitzgerald, privatization can exacerbate this as bureaucrats
become private entrepreneurs. Income inequality then becomes greater, weakening the
solidarity and peace within communities and neighborhoods.

LIBERALISM
The liberal view argues that globalization decreases the risk for conflict. This is backed
by both neoclassical trade theory and modern theorists. In 1776, Adam Smith published his
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book, The Wealth of Nations, which encouraged trade between nations. His theory of the
invisible hand states that everyone collectively benefits when they act in their own self-interest.
This concept is the basis for his theory of absolute advantage. Economists have applied this to
the topic of globalization and trade policy. When countries are motivated by self-interest, the
resulting cooperative strategies and alliances result in greater peace. Forty-one years later, in
1817, David Ricardo posited a new theory, comparative advantage, that further supported free
trade and globalization among nations. Although these two theories differ regarding what
countries should produce for trading, they both agree that everyone is better off with trade.
Around the same time, Kant was writing in support that trade promotes peace. Kant argued
that international trade provides connections between people and creates a perceived “global
community” that works to pacify any disputes.
A more recent trade conflict theory using utility functions and cost benefit analysis to
support the liberal stance comes from Polachek (1980). He argues that the cost of conflict is
equal to the lost welfare gains associated with potential trade losses. Even if conflict does not
lead to total embargos, the terms of trade will be inferior, resulting in welfare losses. These
potential losses deter leaders from initiating conflict with their trading partners. He found that
countries with the most mutual trade get in the least conflict and that the stronger the
dependence two countries had on each other, the more they are deterred from conflict.
When we look at the very basics of trade, simply put, we see nations trying to acquire
resources from other nations. If resource acquisition is the goal, a nation can either choose to
amicably trade, or use armed forces to conquer. Liberman looks at this very topic in his book,
Does Conquest Pay, and concludes cooperation is a significantly more efficient means for
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achieving this goal. Historically, we see this across the globe, where conquest through
colonization brought in vast amounts of resources, but at high costs to the original inhabitants
of the colony, resulting in decolonization, then later, cooperation through trade.
Economic interdependence encourages transparency among trading partners. A study
done on the Correlates of War found that the number of wars and number of participants in
war between 1870 and 1980 remained relatively stable, but between 1980 and 2003, there was
a drastic decrease in both these numbers, correlated with the increase in trade activities and
globalization in this time. Trade provides a platform for governments to repeatedly interact
with each other, removing elements of mistrust and misperception (Hafner-Burton and
Montgomery, 2012).
Restricting imports from other countries often causes some sort of retaliation. A prime
example of this is the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act from during the Great Depression. In the 1920’s,
after WWI, European farmers were beginning to recover and compete with farmers in the US.
This lowered prices, and, in 1929, prompted agricultural lobbyists to demand protection against
foreign agricultural goods; however, there was not enough support to impose tariffs
(Encyclopedia Britannica, 2016). The stock market crash of 1929 was able to push just enough
people to favor protectionism, and the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was signed into law on June 17,
1930 despite over one thousand economists advising President Hoover to veto the bill. It raised
the average tariff by 20%, prompting retaliation from other countries. Within two years, over
twenty countries adopted similar “beggar thy-neighbor” duties, causing the global economy to
spiral. Between 1929 and 1932, U.S trade with Europe fell by two-thirds, and in 1934, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, which reduced tariff levels
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and promoted freer trade in order to revamp the economy and deter potentially more violent
retaliations..
At the sociological level, increased contact from globalization can work to cure
prejudices. More contacts produce more understanding. Moreover, increased contact
necessitates the creation of certain laws to resolve conflicts of interest that might arise (Lamy,
2012). This has been manifested in the rise of global governance entities such as the World
Trade Organization, the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.
At the business level, access to bigger markets encourages firms to be more pacifist and
antiwar. However, as seen during WWII, some industries such as rubber and steel actually see
increased profit from war due to increased demand (Barbieri and Levy, 1999). But for most
modern industries, militarized conflicts have major disruptive effects on economic activities,
and hinder long-term growth.

REALISM
Rather than being a foundation to build policy on, realism functions as an
epistemological tool for explaining history, and forecasting the future. Realists argue that
because there is no centralized global authority, nations rely on themselves to survive the
uncertain future of an ultimately anarchist world (Mazhid, 2015).In short, globalization in itself
does not affect conflict. The realist stance is a middle ground that argues that trade isn’t
necessarily beneficial to all, nor is it necessarily harmful to all.
In classical realism, it is politics, rather than trade or globalization, that causes conflict.
British economist Norman Angell published The Great Illusion in 1910, and as summarized by
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Barbara Tuchman, “Angell showed that in the present financial and economic interdependence
of nations, the victor would suffer equally with the vanquished; therefore war had become
unprofitable; therefore no nation would be so foolish as to start one.” (Angell, 1962). As is
common knowledge, following this book’s publication were WWI and WWII, along with
countless other wars and conflicts. The realist acknowledges that globalization can influence
conflict, but it is not the ultimate deciding factor, so even when globalization is at
unprecedented levels, countries can still experience conflict due to other political factors.
Mercantilism falls under the realism school of thought and was the governing doctrine
of the political economy of many states until the liberal revolution in Britain in the midnineteenth century. During this time, a nation’s well-being was measured by its gold and silver
reserves. The policy implications of mercantilism were to either go abroad and conquer, or
establish favorable trade balances. Spanish exploration of the Americas is a prime example of
the first policy. The thought process behind these policies is that there is a fixed amount of gold
and silver, which results in a zero-sum game with winners and losers. The more gold and silver
one nation acquires, the less other nations acquire. Similarly, if one nation has positive net
exports, meaning it is exporting more than it is importing, at least one other nation has
negative net exports. In both scenarios, gold and silver are being acquired through
globalization, but it is the policy difference that caused conflict.
Hegemonic Stability Theory is another application of realism that states international
stability is most likely when a single hegemon establishes the global economic rules, regimes,
and institutions (Webb & Krasner, 1989). Hegemons, such as the Roman Empire, sustain
economic openness and stability for its members as a means to an end: power. Similarly, after
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WWII, the United States advocated for the creation of a global economic system based on free
trade and capital mobility, creating the WTO, IMF, and World Bank. The US also instituted the
Marshall Plan, keeping communism from taking over Europe. Whoever is the global hegemon is
able to design governing entities that promote its leadership, and having this structure
maintains stability.

MARXISM
Liberalism sees globalization as “good” for lessening conflict, but Marxism sees it as
“good” because it will create conflict that will eventually destroy the social classes and make
way for an open world economy. Even when absolute gains exist, relative gains may be
unequal, causing tensions to rise. Lenin provided the foundation for Marxism, arguing that
trade generates military conflict.
In his “Speech on the Question of Free Trade” delivered in Brussels, Marx argues that,
“…the Free Trade System works destructively. It breaks up old nationalities and carries
antagonism of proletariat and bourgeoisie to the uttermost point. In a word, the Free Trade
system hastens the Social Revolution. In this revolutionary sense alone, gentlemen, I am in
favor of Free Trade.” (Marx, 1848).
One of the main manifestations of this is Dependency theory: a more open economy is
likely to experience conflicts as openness allows exploitative relationships to form, creating
unfair trading practices and furthering inequalities, which then propel armed conflicts (Gartzke
and Li, 2003). This dilemma is due to the neo-colonial trade agreements between more
developed dominant countries that are able to negotiate more advantageous agreements for
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themselves with the lesser developed economies who have less to bargain with. While most
development work has been focused on poverty, we are more and more studying inequality
and how it contributes to the cycle of poverty, and how it can distort indicators of economic
development. Dependency theorists are concerned that with trade and comparative advantage,
developed countries will specialize in goods that are intensive in skilled labor and capital,
maintaining their comparative advantage, while lesser developed countries will specialize in
industries with unskilled workers and smaller profit margins. Neilsen and Alderson (1997) used
Kuznets curves in a study on inequality levels in transitioning economies and found that when
transitioning from agriculture to industrialization, inequality tended to increase, but as the
transition completes, there is actually less inequality than there was at the beginning.

RECONCILING THEORIES
According to Barbieri (2002), the key to reconciling such radically different views of
trade is to understand the core assumptions of each theory. Each of these three theories sees
state action as being driven by different things. The liberalist view sees social welfare driving
state-action. Trade is a vehicle for achieving this goal because it leads to cooperative strategies
between players, and peaceful relations. Globalization creates a positive sum game. The realists
see state-action as being driven by power maximization. Trade is an instrument used in the
pursuit of power, but agreements and cooperative arrangements are temporary and should be
broken when conditions make other means of securing national interests more useful. Marxists
see state-action as a structure driven by the interests of the dominant classes in society,
therefore benefitting that class. However, these theories are limited because they only address
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whether trade works to increase or decrease the likelihood of entering into conflict. What this
paper examines, that none of these theories directly address, is that globalization can either be
beneficial or harmful depending on how fast or slow globalization levels are changing. The
following sections give a brief overview of the history of Africa, then test the impact
globalization and the rate of change of globalization have on conflict.

HISTORY OF CONLICT IN AFRICA
Africa’s conflict history is marked by periods of colonization, decolonization, and ethnic
intrastate disputes. Cilliers and Schünemann (2013) describe African countries as being “born
into” conflicts. They fought with each other pre-independence, which continued postcolonization. Africa has in fact surpassed Asia in the number of war related civilian casualties.
Between 1823 and 2003, Angola, Zimbabwe, South Sudan, and Ethiopia had at least 27 internal
conflicts. Africa has been the leading area for developmental efforts, but the desired outcomes
have yet to be realized.
The European Age of Discovery started in the mid 1500’s when the Portuguese empire
looted and burned down cities in East Africa (Herbst, 1990). By the early 1900’s, most of Africa
was colonized by European countries using similar methods of violence. By the 1950s,
decolonization had begun, fueled by the increased hostility towards colonialism, which often
turned things violent. The first successful instance of decolonization in Africa was the Tunisian
War of Independence from 1952-1956. One of the most famous anti-colonial struggles was the
Algerian War of Independence, which lasted from 1954-1962. Both of these instances were
against France. The Portuguese Colonial War alone led to the independence of Angola, Guinea-
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Bissau, and Mozambique. Much of these liberation movements were influenced by the highly
violent, yet successful tactics of guerrilla warfare, exemplified by the Indonesian National
Revolution and the First Indochina War.
Conflict after decolonization in Africa has primarily been within the state over changing
the borders. Rwanda, Sudan, Angola, Sierra Leone, Congo, Liberia, Ethiopia, and Somalia have
all experienced conflict of this nature (Saheed, 2006). From this, South Sudan has been
separated from Sudan, Eritrea has been separated from Ethiopia, and Congo was divided into
seven different states. Due to globalization, these conflicts have not been entirely internal. For
example, Cuba, the United States, and China were all involved in Angola’s Civil War.
World market factors at the time further inhibited economic growth and conflict
resolution, with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, oil shocks, and the interest rate hike
in the 1980’s (Stanley, 2007). While the vast majority of conflict in Africa has been within states,
interstate war happened in the 1990’s in “Africa’s World War” with six participants, but overall,
intrastate conflicts have been rampant.

INPUT DATA
The following analysis is based on economic, social, and political factors that influence
conflict. The data used was chosen from three publically available data sets: The Global Conflict
Risk Index, The KOF Index of Globalization, and the Quality of Governance Dataset. Table 1
contains summative information about each dataset, including the number of variables,
number of observations, number of countries, time frame, and a url to the indices.
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Table 1: Summative Information of Datasets
Index Variables Observations Countries
GCRI
32
3493
138
KOF
25
10,177
221
QOG
622
13,455
207

Time Frame
1989-2014
1970-2015
1946-2010

URL
conflictrisk.jrc.ec.europa.eu/
www.kof.ethz.ch/en
qog.pol.gu.se

The KOF Index of Globalization was chosen as a data source because of its accessibility
and comprehensibility. The index includes information since 1970 for more than two hundred
countries, and is updated yearly to add more data and to revise the model in order to reflect
the literature and evolving theories and definitions of globalization. The index includes three
dimensions of globalization: economic, social, and political. Because this paper is focused on
economic globalization, only the economic dimension is used. Economic globalization is
measured by both the de facto and de jure measurements of trade globalization and financial
globalization. Table 2 illustrates how each measure is included in the overall economic
globalization dimension.

Table 2- Economic Globalization in the KOF Index
Variable

Source

Economic Globalization
Economic Globalization, de facto
Trade Globalization, de facto
Trade in goods
Trade in services
Trade partner diversification
Financial Globalization, de facto
Foreign direct investment
Portfolio investment
International debt
International reserves
International income payments

World Bank WdI (2017)
World Bank WdI (2017)
calculation based on IMF DOTS (2017)
IMF IIP (2017)
IMF IIP (2017)
IMF IIP (2017)
IMF IIP (2017)
IMF IIP (2017)
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Economic Globalization, de jure
Trade Globalization, de jure
Trade regulations
Trade taxes
Tariffs
Financial Globalization, de jure
Investment restrictions
Capital account openness 1
Capital account openness 2
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Gwarney et al. 2017
World Bank WdI (2017)
Gwarney et al. 2017
Gwarney et al. 2017
Chinn-Ito Index of Financial Openness (2017)
Jahan-Wang Index of Openness (2016)

The Global Conflict Risk Index (GCRI) was developed “to enhance the EU’s conflict
prevention capacities” by contributing to their Early Warning System (EWS). This index sorts 24
variables into five dimensions to assess the likelihood and intensity of conflict. It is from this
index that the data for the controls of the model were chosen. Table 3 lists out the variables
used from the GCRI and the original sources of the data.

Table 3- Variables from GCRI
Variable
GDP per Capita
Population
Regime Type
Repression
Structural Constraints
Unemployment
Water Stress
Youth Bulge
Income Inequality

Source
World Bank (2017)
UN DESA (2017)
Center for Systemic Peace (2017)
Political Terror Scale Project (2017)
BTI: The Bertelsmann Stiftung (2017)
World Bank (2017)
World Resources Institute (2017)
UN DESA (2017)
Harvard Dataverse Network (2017)

The data for the dependent variable, conflict, was taken from the Quality of Governance
Dataset. Their research focuses on how to create and maintain “high quality government
institutions” (Johannson, 2018). Figure 1 below maps out the total number of conflicts from the
QOG dataset and the average rate of change of globalization, calculated from the KOF Index.
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Figure 1- Conflict and Rate of change of Globalization in Africa 1989-2010

CONTROLS
From the GCRI dataset, eight controls were chosen that were significant and backed by
theory. Studies done by the UN have found that poor economic conditions increase the
likelihood for conflict. Of the 48 least developed countries (LDC’s) as defined by the UN, 24
have been in serious conflicts in a span of thirty years. The World Bank’s low-income countries
(LIC) group (defined as having GNP per capita less than $725 in 1994) includes 64 countries, of
which over one-third experienced conflict.
Even in developed countries, output has historically been correlated with conflict. GDP
is the most basic measure of an economy. In 1919, John Maynard Keynes wrote his response to
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The Treaty of Versailles being signed in The Economic Consequences of the Peace. He stressed
that forcing Germany to make payments to the allies, rather than Germany getting a loan to
rebuild its economy, would give rise to conflict all over again“If we aim at the impoverishment of Central Europe, vengeance, I dare say, will not
limp. Nothing can then delay for very long the forces of Reaction and the despairing
convulsions of Revolution, before which the horrors of the later German war will fade
into nothing, and which will destroy, whoever is victor, the civilization and the progress
of our generation.”
The Treaty of Versailles was signed, but Germany fell behind on its payments. Unemployment
and inflation skyrocketed, leading to an economic crash in 1923 (Cline, 1988). That same
month, Hitler led the Nazi Party in a failed coup against the German government. The Nazi
party continued building off the resentment felt by many Germans, and in 1939, WWII broke
out.
Economic vulnerability is not just an issue of unemployment, low per-capita income, or
high debt-to-GDP ratios, but it is largely influenced by the degree of perceived inequality
between groups. Reflecting Marxism, inequality is also controlled for. Inequality creates
tensions within society, and, if Marx’s predictions are correct, the lower class will eventually
rebel. While other measures such as GDP are used to indicate economic well-being, the data
can be misleading if there are high levels of inequality. For example, if the top 1% earn more,
but the bottom 50% earn a little less, GDP can increase, but in reality, the majority of people
are not in a better economic position.
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Population has become a common control in conflict analysis. Malthus most famously
advocated for population control in order to avoid famine and war in his book titled, Essay on
the Principle of Population. His main argument was that the population grows at an exponential
rate, whereas food output grows much slower. This leads to an extreme food shortage, which
leads to unrest, conflict, and ultimately, famine. While Malthus’ predictions may not have come
to fruition, resource scarcity is still an issue states must face, and larger populations lead to
demand-induced scarcity (Urdal, 2005). At the global level, resources are much less scarce, so
states with higher populations will experience this demand-induced scarcity, then look outward
to meet the demand, be it through force or diplomacy.
Regime type is also being controlled for. According to Vreeland (2008), anocracies are
more likely to experience civil war compared to pure democracies or pure dictatorships. He
argues that pure democracy avoids conflict best because it, “presents the possibility for
peaceful collective action.” (p. 401). Ray (1995) says that public opinion has a greater impact
on policymakers, making the approval to engage in conflict slower and therefore less likely in
democratic states. The regime type variable in the GCRI dataset generates scores from 0-10 for
each country, with 10 being pure democracy, and 0 being anocracy. If Vreeland’s theory is
supported by data, a higher score for regime type should lower the number of conflicts.
Level of repression has both a positive and negative correlation with conflict. Besley and
Persson define repression as the, “use of violence by the incumbent government to stay in
office, effectively repressing any laten insurgency by the opposition.” (Besley and Persson,
2009, p. 292). Moore (1998) studied the outcomes of violent and nonviolent dissidence met
with violent and nonviolent state action. The study found an increase in violence when the
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state reacts violently to nonviolent dissidence, and a decrease in violence when the state reacts
violently to violent dissidence. Because repression can spur and deter conflict, it is controlled in
this model.
The structural constraints variable addresses structural transformation using
Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index, which provides, “a knowledge base of factors
leading to success or failure in development and transformation,” (BTI, 2018) Essentially, it
looks at how well states are transitioning towards democracy and an open market economy in
hopes of using the data to inform political strategy. In the GCRI model for predicting the
probability of highly violent conflict, this structural variable had one of the highest coefficients,
indicating its effectiveness (Stamatia et. Al, 2017).
Unemployment was chosen as a control because it contributes to economic well-being
as well as discontent. Theoretically, the unemployed have a lower opportunity cost of engaging
in violence. Collier (2007) argues that economic growth is most influential when it comes to a
country maintaining peace post-conflict. While there are challenges in accurately measuring
unemployment in developing countries, Collier argues that employment is, “the likely route
through which growth might affect the risk of violence.”
Geographical factors have also been researched and found to be significant in explaining
the behaviors of certain countries. As a resource, water is crucial for growing crops,
industrialization, and basic human health, but as a cause of conflict, the only war over water
was 4,500 years ago in Mesopotamia. However, between 805 and 1984, over 3,600 treaties
concerning water have been signed, but a quarter of these have been under less than peaceful
terms. According to Postel, water disputes “have fueled decades of regional tensions, thwarted
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economic development, and risked provoking larger conflicts before eventually giving way to
cooperation.” (Postel, 2001, p. 61). Postel argues that water stress is at an all-time high,
creating zero-sum games both between and within countries where one party “wins” and one
party “loses.” While the history of water stress has mostly led to cooperation between
countries, the path towards cooperation is often tense, and puts a higher risk on the outbreak
of conflict.
The last variable controlled for is what is called the “youth bulge.” A youth bulge is seen
in population pyramids, “when young adults, aged 15 to 29 years, comprise more than 40 percent of all adults (those 15 and older).” (Cincotta, et al., 2003, p. 43). Similar to the
unemployed, young people are theoretically easier for rebel groups to recruit because their
opportunity costs are lower. Studies have found that military action has tended to coincide with
periods where there is a large portion of youth. For example, dating back to the Ottoman
empire, a large portion of the population were men of the ruling class who were reaching
adulthood. The government could not afford to give them all a high salary, land, or bureaucratic
position. Instead, they were given armies to control so they could venture outward. In more
recent history, political scientists at Canada’s University of York have shown that countries with
a large youth population in places like Central Asia are more likely to experience highly intense
conflicts (measured in battle-related deaths per thousand people) than older populations.
(Cincotta, et al., 2003).
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HYPOTHESIS
The hypothesis of a negative relationship between conflict and globalization and a
positive relationship between the rate of change of globalization and conflict is tested using
panel data from 47 countries between 1989-2010. Table 4 contains summary statistics for key
variables.

Table 4: Summary Statistics
Label

Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

Economic Globalization
Rate of Change of Globalization
Unemployment
Youth Bulge
GDP per Capita
Population
Structural Constraints
Water Stress
Regime Type
Income Inequality
Repression

glob
dx
unemp
youth
gdp_cap
pop
struct
water
reg
inequ
repress

1,039
1,000
1,026
1,026
1,026
1,026
1,026
1,026
1,026
1,026
1,026

42.58564
0.0085959
5.515189
7.985712
6.517139
3.863515
7.718368
4.110889
4.715751
4.844661
5.41423

12.193
0.0757626
2.18873
1.223571
1.523765
1.514114
1.661948
1.796396
2.750099
1.693279
2.624733

16.78734
-0.2626225
0
2.194406
2.468641
0.3379074
3
1.710004
1
2.028978
0

82.37633
0.5049728
10
10
10
7.571908
10
10
10
10
10

This hypothesis reflects the liberalist view that the correlation between conflict and
globalization is negative, as well as reflects the influence of the above controls, and predicts
that the correlation between the rate of change of globalization and conflict is positive:
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 − 𝛽, glob + 𝛽2 𝑑𝑥 + 𝛽5 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 + 𝛽: 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ − 𝛽= 𝑔𝑑𝑝?@A + 𝛽B 𝑝𝑜𝑝
+ 𝛽C 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽F 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 − 𝛽I 𝑟𝑒𝑔 + 𝛽,J 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢 + 𝛽,, 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠

REGRESSION MODEL
To analyze the effects of globalization and the rate of change of globalization, seven
regressions were built. Table 5 contains the output for each of these regressions. The
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dependent variable is the number of conflicts, with the independent variables being
globalization and the rate of change of globalization, while controlling for the variables
discussed above. The rate of change of globalization was calculated with the following
equation: (glob-glob[_n-1])/glob[_n-1].
The first regression just looks at globalization and the rate of change of globalization
without controlling for anything. The negative coefficient on globalization indicates that higher
levels of globalization are correlated with lower levels of conflict. On the other hand, the
positive coefficient on the rate of change of globalization indicates that higher rates of change
in globalization levels is correlated with more conflicts. Although globalization is more
statistically significant in this regression, the coefficient on the rate of change of globalization is
over 90 times greater than the coefficient on the globalization variable, indicating that the rate
of change of globalization has a significantly higher impact on conflict.
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 − 0.0152 glob + 1.377 𝑑𝑥
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Table 5: Regression Results
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Number
of
Conflicts

Number
of
Conflicts

Number
of
Conflicts

Number
Number of
of
Conflicts
Conflicts

-0.00529

-0.00431

-0.00337

-0.00317

-0.000267 0.00214

(0.450)

(0.512)

(0.609)

(0.640)

(0.970)

(0.744)

1.094

1.086

1.075

1.069

0.970

0.369

(0.174)

(0.171)

(0.177)

(0.180)

(0.228)

(0.640)

-0.0570

-0.0486

-0.0647

-0.0641

-0.0638

-0.0557

(0.129)

(0.199)

(0.106)

(0.112)

(0.112)

(0.203)

Number
Number of
of
Conflicts
Conflicts
Globalization

-0.0152
(0.018)

Rate of Change of Globalization 1.377

*

(0.074)
Unemployment

Youth Bulge

**

0.324

GDP per Capita

Population

***

0.390

***

0.392

***

***

***

***

0.0228

-0.254

(0.738)

(0.003)

(0.005)

(0.006)

(0.005)

(0.040)

**

0.0499

0.0478

0.0463

0.0422

-0.103

(0.019)

(0.395)

(0.416)

(0.441)

(0.482)

(0.125)

0.135

Structural Constraints

0.395

***

(0.000)
Water Stress

0.403

***

***

-0.243

0.404

***

***

(0.000)

0.291

(0.000)

-0.245

(0.000)

0.411

(0.000)

***

(0.000)

0.391

(7)

-0.254

0.407

***

***

(0.003)
-0.197

0.141

**

*

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.052)

0.0721

0.0710

0.0537

-0.00317

(0.260)

(0.272)

(0.410)

(0.967)

-0.00373

0.00256

-0.0220

(0.907)

(0.937)

(0.480)

-0.0745

0.0162

(0.165)

(0.757)

Regime Type

Income Inequality

Repression

0.336

***

(0.000)
Constant

Observations
Pseudo R

2

***

-5.524

***

-5.893

***

-5.882

***

-5.700

***

-4.866

***

-0.408

-3.879

(0.122)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

556

556

556

556

556

556

556

0.010

0.050

0.091

0.093

0.093

0.095

0.221
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p-values in parentheses
*
**
***
p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01

Regressions 2-6 slowly add more controls to the model. The output of Regression 2 is
below. Once controls are added, neither globalization nor the rate of change of globalization
are significant. However, the p-values for globalization increase dramatically from 0.018 in the
first regression to 0.970 in the sixth regression, whereas the p-values for the rate of change of
globalization only increase from 0.074 to .228. This indicates that the rate of change of
globalization, while not being the most significant explanation for conflict, is more correlated
than just the level of globalization.
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 − 0.00529 glob + 1.094 𝑑𝑥 − 0.0570 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 + 0.324 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ
− 0.0228 𝑔𝑑𝑝?@A + 0.135 𝑝𝑜𝑝

Controlling for repression in Regression 7 had a major impact on the model. Both
globalization and the rate of change of globalization are significant for only about 30% of the
data, and, most notably, the coefficient on globalization became positive. While further
research must be done to explain this, I hypothesize that highly repressive nations, like North
Korea, are more secluded, participating less in the global market, and experience less
globalization.
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 + 0.00214 glob + 0.369 𝑑𝑥 − 0.0557 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 + 0.291 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ
− 0.197 𝑔𝑑𝑝?@A − 0.103 𝑝𝑜𝑝 + 0.141 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡 − 0.00317 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟
− 0.022 𝑟𝑒𝑔 + 0.0162 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢 + 0.336 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠
IMPLICATIONS

Running Head: GLOBALIZATION AND CONFLICT

Stephens 24

Based on economic, social, and political factors, the regression model gives insight into
the significance and scope of the effect globalization and the rate of globalization have on
conflict. While no causal claims can be made, we can make observations based on the results.
Looking at the big picture, this paper shows why there is a dialogue with competing theories
regarding the relationship between globalization and conflict. First, the data officially supports
the realist theory that factors other than globalization are what influence conflict since both
globalization variables lost significance once controls were added. However, despite not being
significant, the data does support the liberalist theory that globalization and conflict are
inversely related. This means that, holding the rate of change constant, a more economically
integrated nation experiences less conflict. Lastly, the data shows that the rate of change of
globalization is positively correlated with conflict, which would support Marxism. This means
that when businesses, governments, and NGO’s make a big change in factors such as FDI and
trade, they could be having a negative impact.
This paper also leaves room for further research. As mentioned before, distinguishing
between interstate and intrastate conflict could add to our knowledge. Furthermore,
controlling for endogeneity and reverse causality could provide keen insights on how the rate of
globalization impacts conflict since factors that influence globalization and conflict are closely
tied. By delving deeper into this research, one of the three theories could prove to be correct,
which would further inform the way countries interact through globalization.
Combining these findings, organizations can justify their global integration since
increased globalization lessens conflict, and also strategize how many resources they will
devote in a year, favoring a slower integration in order to not dramatically increase the
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likelihood for conflict. However, to have the greatest impact on lessening conflict, organizations
should target some of the factors that were controlled for that were the most significant such
as the youth bulge, GDP per capita, and structural constraints.
The last major implication is that countries must address their internal repression to
prevent conflict before turning towards globalization as a source of peacekeeping. Repression
was found to be the most significant variable in the model, meaning that of all the variables,
repression is most correlated with conflict. In countries with repression, all of the other
variables, including globalization and the rate of globalization matter much less. In countries
with no repression, more factors have a significant impact on conflict, and the rate of change of
globalization becomes much more significant than the level of globalization.
These findings further the dialogue of the relationship between globalization and
conflict. The paper finds that the theories of liberalism, realism, and Marxism aren’t necessarily
in direct opposition. Rather, while other factors are more important in addressing conflict,
globalization acts to lessen conflict, while high rates of change of globalization have the
opposite effect. In an increasingly globalized world, policy makers and business leaders can use
these findings to better address conflict and work towards a more peaceful world.
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FAITH ADDENDUM
Since I started taking economics classes at SPU, I have been fascinated by trade and
globalization. Moving from a small town of 200 people to a city like Seattle showed me how big
and populous, yet how small and interconnected the world is. In my research paper on trade, I
noticed a gap between theory and practice in trade policy. Trade theory says that trade makes
everyone better off, but as we see today, there are pushes for inward-facing protectionist
policies. Through this research and related classes, I learned how critical trade is for
development and growth, both in terms of GDP, but also for human capital. In short, trade
increases capacity.
From a development perspective, my studies have touched on conflict hindering
development. An increasing number of the poor live in fragile and conflict-affected countries.
My interest in development primarily came from my religious background. The church I grew up
attending was very evangelical, so serving others was always held in high esteem. Although I
am no longer religious, I am still passionate about service in the international community, and
about finding ways to improve the lives of those living in lesser developed regions. Finding ways
to reduce conflict is one means of doing this. This is why I chose to study development
economics. It is essentially the secular, academic version of being a missionary. Truth in
economics is found in time and experience. Unlike natural sciences, we cannot conduct
economic experiments in a lab. The world is the lab of economists. Economic truths then, can
only be discovered with time.
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